

Rabalder

- at håndtere konflikter med børn

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Bo
HEJLSKOV ELVEN

Konflikt

Handler oftest om løsninger

- Jeg har ett problem som jeg løser
- Min løsning bliver tit ett problem for barnet, som han eller hun løser
- På en måde som bliver et problem för mig, som jeg løser...

Du kan kun løse denne slags konflikter ved at finde en løsning som ikke er et problem for den du er i konflikt med



Løsninger

Vi vil helst lære børn at bruge løsninger som ikke er et problem for os

Det er bedre at vi finder løsninger som ikke er noget problem for børnene

Så slipper vi af med en masse magtesløshed



Parkeringsvagten

Attributionsteoretisk eksempel

Hvis man får en parkeringsbøde kan man have to forskellige holdninger

- Jeg parkerede det forkerte sted. Det var dumt
- Parkeringsvagten er en idiot
 - Tager man holdning to stiller man måske bilen på samme sted dagen efter
 - Og får en ny parkeringsbøde
 - Og bliver bekræftet: Parkeringsvagter er idioter
 - Og lærer desværre ingenting





Attributionsteori

Frans af Assisi beskrev det nok bedst i historien om ulven i Gubbio:

”Ulven gør hvad ulven er”

Vi skal finde ud af hvad vi skal gøre

Behavioral/Systems/Cognitive

Evaluating the Negative or Valuing the Positive? Neural Mechanisms Supporting Feedback-Based Learning across Development

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How children learn from positive and negative performance feedback lies at the foundation of successful learning and is therefore of great importance for educational practice. In this study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine the neural

A ten-year prospective study of aggression in a special secure unit for dangerous patients

STÅL BJØRKLY

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Bjorkly, S. (1999). A ten-year prospective study of aggression in a special secure unit for dangerous patients. *Scandinavian Journal of Psychology*, 40, 57–63.

In a 10-year prospective study inpatient aggression was investigated in a Norwegian special secure unit covering a well-defined catchment area with a population of 240,000. The seven bed special secure unit receives dangerous, psychotic patients for long-term treatment. Only 19 patients were treated during the ten-year study lasting from 1 April 1987 to 1 April 1997. Incidents of aggressive behavior were recorded on the Report Form for Aggressive Episodes by the nursing staff. The study aimed to identify, classify and measure the occurrence of aggressive behavior, as well as the relative frequency of events preceding such behavior. A total of 2021 incidents of aggressive behavior were recorded. Seventy-five per cent of the aggressive acts were verbal or physical threats, while the remaining 25% were physical assaults directed at other persons. Four patients accounted for about 80% of the aggressive encounters. Nursing staff were victims in about 90% of the incidents. Serious physical injury was extremely rare. Situations pertaining to limit-setting and problems of communication accounted for approximately 90% of the precipitants of aggressive behavior. There were no sex differences regarding the occurrence of aggressive behavior.

Key words: Violence, psychiatric inpatients, prospective study.

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Economics Working Papers

2017-10

Lowering the minimum age of criminal responsibility: Consequences for juvenile crime and education

Anna Piil Damm, Britt Østergaard Larsen, Helena Skyt Nielsen and Marianne Simonsen



**DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
AND BUSINESS ECONOMICS**
AARHUS UNIVERSITY

The School to Prison Pipeline: Long-Run Impacts of School Suspensions on Adult Crime

Andrew Bacher-Hicks, Stephen B. Billings, David J. Deming

NBER Working Paper No. 26257

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Schools face important policy tradeoffs in monitoring and managing student behavior. Strict discipline policies may stigmatize suspended students and expose them to the criminal justice system at a young age. On the other hand, strict discipline acts as a deterrent and limits harmful spillovers of misbehavior onto other students. This paper estimates the net impact of school discipline on student achievement, educational attainment and adult criminal activity. Using exogenous variation in school assignment caused by a large and sudden boundary change and a supplementary design based on principal switches, we show that schools with higher suspension rates have substantial negative long-run impacts. Students assigned to a school that has a one standard deviation higher suspension rate are 15 to 20 percent more likely to be arrested and incarcerated as adults. We also find negative impacts on educational attainment. The negative impacts of attending a high suspension school are largest for males and minorities.

The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment

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Valerie Treyer,³ Melanie Schellhammer,² Ulrich Schnyder,⁴
Alfred Buck,³ Ernst Fehr^{2,5†}

Many people voluntarily incur costs to punish violations of social norms. Evolutionary models and empirical evidence indicate that such altruistic punishment has been a decisive force in the evolution of human cooperation. We used H₂¹⁵O positron emission tomography to examine the neural basis for altruistic punishment of defectors in an economic exchange. Subjects could punish defection either symbolically or effectively. Symbolic punishment did not reduce the defector's economic payoff, whereas effective punishment did reduce the payoff. We scanned the subjects' brains while they learned about the defector's abuse of trust and determined the punishment. Effective punishment, as compared with symbolic punishment, activated the dorsal striatum, which has been implicated in the processing of rewards that accrue as a result of goal-directed actions. Moreover, subjects with stronger activations in the dorsal striatum were willing to incur greater costs in order to punish. Our findings support the hypothesis that people derive satisfaction from punishing norm violations and that the activation in the dorsal striatum reflects the anticipated satisfaction from punishing defectors.

The nature and level of cooperation in human societies is unmatched in the animal world. Humans cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are absent. Recent research indi-

are altruistic if they involve costly acts that confer economic benefits on other individuals. If, for example, an individual sanctions a person who cheated in an economic exchange, the cheater's future interaction partners will benefit from this punishment be-

seem to feel bad if they observe that norm violations are not punished, and they seem to feel relief and satisfaction if justice is established. Many languages even have proverbs indicating such feelings, for example, "Revenge is sweet."

A design to study the punishment of defectors. We examined the hypothesis that people derive satisfaction from the punishment of norm violations by combining an economic experiment involving real monetary payoffs with positron emission tomography (PET). Our hypothesis predicts that altruistic punishment is associated with the activation of brain areas related to reward processing. Single-neuron recording in nonhuman primates (9–11) and neuroimaging studies with humans using money as a reward medium (12–16) reliably indicate that the striatum is a key part of reward-related neural circuits. Moreover, if altruistic punishment occurs because the punisher anticipates deriving satisfaction from punishing, we should observe activation predominantly in those reward-related brain areas that are associated with goal-directed behavior. Single-neuron recording in nonhuman primates (17–19) provides strong evidence that the dorsal striatum is crucial for the integration of reward information and behavioral information in the sense of a goal-directed mechanism. A recent neuroimaging study also supports the view that the dorsal striatum is implicated in the processing of rewards that accrue as a result of a decision (20).

The evolution of altruistic punishment

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Both laboratory and field data suggest that people punish noncooperators even in one-shot interactions. Although such “altruistic punishment” may explain the high levels of cooperation in human societies, it creates an evolutionary puzzle: existing models suggest that altruistic cooperation among nonrelatives is evolutionarily stable only in small groups. Thus, applying such models to the evolution of altruistic punishment leads to the prediction that people will not incur costs to punish others to provide benefits to large groups of nonrelatives. However, here we show that an important asymmetry between altruistic cooperation and altruistic punishment allows altruistic punishment to evolve in populations engaged in one-time, anonymous interactions. This process allows both altruistic punishment and altruistic cooperation to be maintained even when groups are large and other parameter values approximate conditions that characterize cultural evolution in the small-scale societies in which humans lived for most of our prehistory.

Unlike any other species, humans cooperate with non-kin in large groups. This behavior is puzzling from an evolutionary perspective because cooperating individuals incur individual

is bx , so the payoff disadvantage of the contributors is a constant c independent of the distribution of types in the population. Now add a third type, “punishers” who cooperate and then punish each defector in their group, reducing each defector’s payoff by p/n at a cost k/n to the punisher. If the frequency of punishers is y , the expected payoffs become $b(x + y) - c$ to contributors, $b(x + y) - py$ to defectors, and $b(x + y) - c - k(1 - x - y)$ to punishers. Contributors have higher fitness than defectors if punishers are sufficiently common that the cost of being punished exceeds the cost of cooperating ($py > c$). Punishers suffer a fitness disadvantage of $k(1 - x - y)$ compared with nonpunishing contributors. Thus, punishment is altruistic and mere contributors are “second-order free riders.” Note, however, that the payoff disadvantage of punishers relative to contributors approaches zero as defectors become rare because there is no need for punishment. In a more realistic model (like the one below) the costs of monitoring or punishing occasional mistaken defections would mean that punishers have slightly lower fitness than contributors, and that defection is the only one of these three strategies that is an evolutionarily stable strategy in a single isolated population. However, the fact that punishers experience

A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation

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Richard M. Ryan
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A meta-analysis of 128 studies examined the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. As predicted, engagement-contingent, completion-contingent, and performance-contingent rewards significantly undermined free-choice intrinsic motivation ($d = -0.40$, -0.36 , and -0.28 , respectively), as did all rewards, all tangible rewards, and all expected rewards. Engagement-contingent and completion-contingent rewards also significantly undermined self-reported interest ($d = -0.15$, and -0.17), as did all tangible rewards and all expected rewards. Positive feedback enhanced both free-choice behavior ($d = 0.33$) and self-reported interest ($d = 0.31$). Tangible rewards tended to be more detrimental for children than college students, and verbal rewards tended to be less enhancing for children than college students. The authors review 4 previous meta-analyses of this literature and detail how this study's methods, analyses, and results differed from the previous ones.

A FINE IS A PRICE

*URI GNEEZY and ALDO RUSTICHINI**

ABSTRACT

The deterrence hypothesis predicts that the introduction of a penalty that leaves everything else unchanged will reduce the occurrence of the behavior subject to the fine. We present the result of a field study in a group of day-care centers that contradicts this prediction. Parents used to arrive late to collect their children, forcing a teacher to stay after closing time. We introduced a monetary fine for late-coming parents. As a result, the number of late-coming parents increased significantly. After the fine was removed no reduction occurred. We argue that penalties are usually introduced into an incomplete contract, social or private. They may change the information that agents have, and therefore the effect on behavior may be opposite of that expected. If this is true, the deterrence hypothesis loses its predictive strength, since the clause “everything else is left unchanged” might be hard to satisfy.

Extrinsic Rewards Diminish Costly Sharing in 3-Year-Olds

Julia Ulber, Katharina Hamann, and Michael Tomasello

Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology

Two studies investigated the influence of external rewards and social praise in young children's fairness-related behavior. The motivation of ninety-six 3-year-olds' to equalize unfair resource allocations was measured in three scenarios (collaboration, windfall, and dictator game) following three different treatments (material reward, verbal praise, and neutral response). In all scenarios, children's willingness to engage in costly sharing was negatively influenced when they had received a reward for equal sharing during treatment than when they had received praise or no reward. The negative effect of material rewards was not due to subjects responding in kind to their partner's termination of rewards. These results provide new evidence for the intrinsic motivation of prosociality—in this case, costly sharing behavior—in preschool children.

Children begin to behave prosocially very early in development. Studies have documented infants' tendencies to comfort or help others in need (e.g., Dunfield, Kuhlmeier, O'Connell, & Kelley, 2011;

of sufficient external contingencies. If individuals are induced to engage in an activity in order to receive a reward, they often conclude that their actions were primarily motivated by the external incentive rather

Extrinsic Rewards Undermine Altruistic Tendencies in 20-Month-Olds

Felix Warneken and Michael Tomasello
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology

The current study investigated the influence of rewards on very young children's helping behavior. After 20-month-old infants received a material reward during a treatment phase, they subsequently were less likely to engage in further helping during a test phase as compared with infants who had previously received social praise or no reward at all. This so-called *overjustification effect* suggests that even the earliest helping behaviors of young children are intrinsically motivated and that socialization practices involving extrinsic rewards can undermine this tendency.

Keywords: altruism, helping, intrinsic motivation, socialization, overjustification effect

Supplemental materials: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0013860.supp>

Since at least the time of Rousseau and Locke, there has been debate about the nature of human altruism. Do people go out of their way to help others because they are inherently altruistic or because they are shaped by their social environments to be that way? In terms of more modern psychological concepts, we may ask whether human altruism is intrinsically or extrinsically motivated; that is, do human beings help one another because the

behaviors only because they are externally rewarded for doing so (Bar-Tal, 1982; Cialdini, Baumann, & Kenrick, 1981; Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, & Penner, 2006). Rather, these findings suggest that very early in development humans might have an intrinsic motivation to act altruistically at least in some circumstances (Eisenberg, 1992; Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006).

A curious feature of intrinsic motivation is that it can be under-

The Emotional and Academic Consequences of Parental Conditional Regard: Comparing Conditional Positive Regard, Conditional Negative Regard, and Autonomy Support as Parenting Practices

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Ben Gurion University of the Negev

Christopher P. Niemiec, Richard M. Ryan,
and Edward L. Deci
University of Rochester

The authors conducted 2 studies of 9th-grade Israeli adolescents (169 in Study 1, 156 in Study 2) to compare the parenting practices of conditional positive regard, conditional negative regard, and autonomy support using data from multiple reporters. Two socialization domains were studied: emotion control and academics. Results were consistent with the self-determination theory model of internalization, which posits that (a) conditional negative regard predicts feelings of resentment toward parents, which then predict dysregulation of negative emotions and academic disengagement; (b) conditional positive regard predicts feelings of internal compulsion, which then predict suppressive regulation of negative emotions and grade-focused academic engagement; and (c) autonomy support predicts sense of choice, which then predicts integrated regulation of negative emotions and interest-focused academic engagement. These findings suggest that even parents' use of conditional positive regard as a socialization practice has adverse emotional and academic consequences, relative to autonomy support.

Keywords: parental conditional regard, autonomy support, emotion regulation, academic engagement



Pædagogik

Platon anså at børn
er født vilde og skal
tæmmes



Pædagogik

Aristoteles anså at børn er umodne voksne som nok skal vokse op til gode voksne

Præcis som en plante. Med vand og næring går det oftest fint

Men visse planter har brug for en pind at støtte sig til. Særligt når det blæser



Pædagogik

Debatten handler om
hvad vores mål er

- At få barnet til at adlyde
gennem manipulation eller
autoritære metoder
- At få barnet til at blive
selvstændig gennem støtte
 - autonomistøttende
pædagogik og opdragelse

Børn som kan opføre sig ordentligt, gør det

Ross W. Greene



Ellers kan de måske ikke leve op til krav og forventninger til

- At forstå konsekvenser af egne handlinger
- Fleksibilitet
- Udholdenhed
- Impulskontrol
- Sociale evner
- Evnen til at planlægge og gennemføre
- Affektregulering
- Stressfølsomhed
- Efterrettelighed




Affektregulering

Og når vi har for store forventninger på os er vi nødt til at bruge strategier som


- At nægte




Affektregulering




Affektregulering



Affektregulering



Affektregulering



Kontrolprincippet


Man er nødt til at have kontrol over sig selv hvis man skal kunne samarbejde



Affektregulering

Strategier

- At nægte
- At lyve
- At slå
- At stikke af
- At true og bruge skældsord





Værktøjskasserne

- en kvalitetssikringsmodel

At håndtere det som sker uden at
eskalere situationerne

At evaluere hvorfor det blev
svært

At forandre så det ikke sker igen



Værktøjskasserne


- en kvalitetssikringsmodel

At håndtere det som sker uden
at eskalere situationerne


At evaluere hvorfor det blev
svært

At forandre så det ikke sker igen

Metode: Afstemt pædagogik



Metode: Ved kaos





Pergamon

Child Abuse & Neglect 30 (2006) 1333–1342

Child Abuse
& Neglect

Learning from tragedy: A survey of child and adolescent restraint fatalities


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
Received 3 March 2005; received in revised form 3 February 2006; accepted 24 February 2006

Available online 15 November 2006

Metode: At lande



Metode: Hverdag igen





Værktøjskasserne

- en kvalitetssikringsmodel

At håndtere det som sker uden at
eskalere situationerne

At evaluere hvorfor det blev
svært

At forandre så det ikke sker igen



Værktøjskasserne

- en kvalitetssikringsmodel

At håndtere svære situationer
uden at eskalere dem

At evaluere hvorfor det blev
svært

At forandre så det ikke sker igen



Pædagogik

En plante har brug for vand og næring, så går det oftest fint
Men visse planter har brug for en pind at støtte sig til. Særligt når det blæser